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International academic studies show strong support to momentum effects but the 
literature applied to Brazil presents mixed results. This study examines the 
profitability of momentum strategies in the Brazilian market from February 1995 until 
December 2017, replicating the methodology of the pioneering work of Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993). “Winners Minus Losers” strategies beat the market according to 
their risk-return profile. However, results obtained suggest lack of evidence of 
significant abnormal returns in the full period of estimation and in normal periods. 
“Winners” manage to exhibit positive abnormal returns for the full period, suggesting 
that following a long-only strategy is more attractive for investors. The sub-period 
analysis conducted demonstrates that “winners” drive returns, whereas “losers” 
negatively impact profitability and are also suggested to be the main cause of the 
momentum crashes.  
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The aim of this article is to investigate the importance of momentum as an anomaly in 
the Brazilian market and present the analysis of a relative strength momentum 
strategy applied to a sample of stocks from the Bovespa stock exchange in São Paulo, 
Brazil. The strategy follows the one implemented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
and is applied to Brazilian equities filtered for liquidity from February 1995 until 
December 2017. This research investigates the performance and application of a 
pioneering momentum strategy to Brazil, over a longer estimation period than 
previous studies, with a sample of data carefully chosen in order to take into account 
the size and liquidity of stocks. Furthermore, special focus is attributed to the defined 
periods of crisis for Brazil in order to attempt to justify performance. 
 
The use of historical information to make investment decisions has challenged 
financial theory since the existence of financial markets. Levy (1967) established the 
first trading rule for successful relative strength strategies. These relative strength 
strategies aim to generate significant abnormal returns by taking advantage of stock 
price momentum exhibited by past winners (technical analysis). According to the 
principle of market efficiency, this approach and such strategies should not yield 
satisfactory results. Nonetheless, investors have consistently managed to achieve a 
superior performance, rendering stock price momentum a very interesting topic both 
for investors and academics. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first identified momentum in the US market. This study 
demonstrated that momentum portfolios generate significant abnormal profits, 
yielding a monthly return of 1.3% from 1965-1989. Thereafter, many others 
confirmed the existence of this anomaly elsewhere. It was shown that this 
phenomenon is observed for different asset classes (Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen, 
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2013), in different markets (Rouwenhorst, 1998; Griffin, Ji & Martin, 2003; Chui, 
Titman & Wei, 2010) and across time (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). 
 
However, the pioneering studies applied to the Brazilian stock market, in the context 
of long-short strategies of good-bad momentum portfolios, present mixed results that 
differ mainly because of the time span considered, the data collected and the strategy 
construction methods. For example, Bonomo and Dall’Agnol (2003) and Fonte and 
Carmona (2005) rejected the momentum effect identified by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) in the US market. Other such studies that claim relative strength momentum 
strategies fail to achieve positive and significant abnormal returns are those of Cruz 
(2009) and Kimura (2003). On the other hand, Piccoli et al. (2015) suggest the 
possibility to generate significant abnormal returns from these strategies, confirming 
the existence of this anomaly in Brazil. Other studies, such as Mussa et al. (2007) and 
Neto et al. (2011) also support this possibility. 
 
The profitability of such strategies is clear evidence against the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH) since all that is needed to generate these abnormal returns are 
historical prices. Protectors of this EMH tried to explain the momentum effect by the 
empirical nature of the studies conducted. For instance, Lo and MacKinley (1990) 
argued that these abnormal profits might be the result of “data snooping” bias. 
However, this was rapidly refuted by the research of Grundy and Martin (2001) who 
demonstrated abnormal profits in the US equity markets since the 1920s. Another 
argument was that momentum profitability is merely a compensation for risk, thus 
disregarding it as evidence against the EMH. Fama and French (1996) also overturned 
this explanation by showing that risk factors assumed in their previous study of 1993 
cannot explain the momentum profit even though these factors can describe the 
returns of other anomalies such as the size effect. 
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This paper is structured in the following way: Section II provides an overview of the 
already existing literature concerning this topic. Section III describes the data and 
other variables used, and its sources. Section IV gives a detailed explanation of the 
methodology implemented in this research. Section V discusses and describes the 
conducted analysis and obtained results. Lastly, section VI presents the final remarks 
and conclusions of this thesis. 
 
Literature review 
The main principle defended by the EMH, formalized by Fama (1970) is the absence 
of arbitrage in the risk/return relation of financial assets. Thus, this theory suggests 
that the price of an asset reflects all available information regarding the issuing 
institution, making it impossible for investors to generate abnormal returns. This way, 
investment strategies that aim to generate higher returns will bear more risk. This 
assumption is also present in the CAPM model proposed by Sharpe (1964), for which 
the expected return of an asset is a function of its systematic risk, that is, its sensitivity 
to variations in the financial market.  
 
Around the 1980s, the CAPM model was deemed insufficient and new models that 
incorporate new risk factors besides the asset’s systematic risk or ! were created. In 
this context, Fama and French (1992) demonstrated the importance of other factors 
such as company size and book-to-market ratio. Finally, Fama and French (1993) 
proposed a three-factor model that adds to a company’s systematic risk, the risks 
arising from the size and the book-to-market ratio of the same company. 
 
However, the financial literature reports the existence of various investment strategies 
that generate abnormal returns that aren’t explained by the contemporary models of 
risk. Amongst these approaches, one of the most notorious ones is called momentum. 
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These strategies are based on the tendency of assets to keep the same recent behavior 
relative to the market in the short-term. Momentum has consistently allowed investors 
to reach superior performance. There is evidence of this phenomenon internationally 
and many studies specifically applied to Brazil, which is considered as a unique case. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are the pioneers to discover the momentum effect by 
applying trading strategies that buy past winners and sell past losers in the North 
American market. The results of this study proved the possibility of significant 
abnormal returns in 15 of the 16 strategies tested. These momentum strategies 
consisted on buying high performing stocks between the last 3 to 12 months and 
selling the worst performing stocks within the same time periods, holding them for 
periods also ranging from 3 to 12 months. This tendency reverted for holding periods 
superior to 12 months, suggesting that the momentum effect is only present in the 
short-term.  
  
Following the work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), others started testing the 
existence of the momentum effect in international markets. Key studies demonstrating 
this are those of Fama and French (1996) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) for the 
North American market, Rouwenhorst (1998) for the European market and 
Rouwenhorst (1999) for Emerging markets, including Brazil. This latest study used 
87 listed Brazilian companies from 1982-1997, testing a (6, 6) strategy (both 
formation and holding periods are 6 months). Besides finding positive results for the 
momentum factor when using the mean of the Emerging countries, the research did 
not find the existence of momentum for Brazil individually. This market anomaly 
became so relevant that Carhart (1997) incorporated the momentum factor to the 
Fama and French three-factor model, proving the importance of this fourth factor to 
explain asset prices. However, as already mentioned, when applied to the Brazilian 
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market, it has been showed that momentum strategies don’t generate statistically 
significant profits, suggesting that Brazil might be an exception. 
 
The basic assumption for there to be the possibility to generate abnormal returns from 
past information is that markets are inefficient. The research of Minardi (2004) aimed 
to investigate the weak-form EMH in Brazil and to do so, 649 stocks were selected 
from September 1994 until August 2000. In this study, the author demonstrated 
evidence of a significant relation between historical and future information of stock 
returns, which contradicts the random walk hypothesis in the Brazilian market. On the 
contrary, Kimura (2003) concluded from his study the impossibility to gain 
extraordinary profits from contrarian or momentum strategies in the specific case of 
assets from the Brazilian stock market. 
 
Varga and Brito (2016) closely followed the approach of Fama and French (1993, 
1996) to analyze the main factors that can explain the cross section of expected 
returns in Brazil. Just like the evidence from the US, the authors found that: the 
“Book-to-Market” variable showed some explanatory power; the momentum 
premium had similar relevance, being more or less significant depending on liquidity 
and the period of estimation. Even though positive relations were found between the 
cross section of returns and a few risk factors, none of these characteristics showed 
explanatory power for all subsamples studied. Nonetheless, this research provides a 
good indication of the fundamental risk factors to explain financial returns in Brazil. 
 
Bonomo and Dall’Agnol (2003) found evidence of overreaction in the Brazilian 
market for the same time horizon considered to previous applications in the United 
States. Unlike DeBondt and Thaler (1985) that demonstrated that there is a long-term 
expectation directly related to a reversion tendency, the two previous authors found 
that this overreaction is more intense in the short-term, thus rejecting the hypothesis 
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of the momentum effect displayed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for the same time 
horizon. This way, it is shown the occurrence of significant returns for investors 
adopting contrarian momentum strategies and that there is lack of evidence of the 
momentum effect in short time periods. Following this conclusion, Cruz (2009) 
simultaneously explores the abnormal returns from momentum and mean reversion 
strategies in Brazil. The author introduces the idea of a stronger momentum effect in 
the long-term but the Brazilian market dynamics reject this. 
 
Further evidence against that demonstrated by Bonomo and Dall’Agnol (2003) is that 
of Fonte and Carmona (2005) who rejected the momentum and overreaction 
hypothesis, indicating the weak efficiency of the Brazilian stock market. The previous 
research selected 98 stocks from the Bovespa index from June 1994 until June 2004 
and analyzed contrarian strategies utilizing 6, 12, 18, 24 months for both the 
formation and holding periods. Although the persistence of returns is verified for the 
holding period of 6 months, this strategy was not deemed as statistically significant. 
 
On the other hand, Piccoli et al. (2015) claim these long-short strategies do generate 
significant excess returns in normal periods that are used up during periods of crisis. 
This research paper used the logarithmic returns of the 200 biggest companies of the 
Bovespa stock exchange between January 1997 and March 2014, calculated from data 
adjusted for inflation and dividends collected from Economatica. Essentially, in this 
paper the authors rank stocks each month based of their cumulative returns of the past 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 months. The strategy consisted of buying the stocks 
belonging to the superior quintile (“winners”) and selling those of the inferior quintile 
(“losers”). The results of the present article suggest that the weak evidence of the 
momentum effect in Brazil aren’t related to the market anomaly, but instead could be 
explained by the crashes that the momentum portfolios suffer during crises, which, in 
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a short time span, cancel out a big part of the profits created in other periods. In 
consequence, average returns generated by these strategies, although positive, aren’t 
significant in long time periods that include financial crisis in the Brazilian market. 
 
However, other authors in their investigations of the existence of the momentum 
effect in the Brazilian market, such as Mussa et al. (2007) and Neto et al. (2011), 
obtained results indicating the possibility of abnormal returns from relative strength 
momentum strategies. Neto et al. (2011) analyzed the persistence of stock returns 
traded in the Bovespa index on the short-term, testing the hypothesis that “winner” 
stocks remain “winners” and “loser” stocks remain “losers” in a 6-month period of 
analysis. Using data from October 1994 until March 2011, the results of this paper 
showed that “winner” stocks with low liquidity and an intermediary trade level were 
the best investment options in Brazil. Mussa et al. (2007) replicated the momentum 
strategy by Jegadeesch and Titman (1993) using monthly returns from all listed stocks 
from the Bovespa index from 1995 to 2006. This paper found that 3 out of the 16 
tested strategies showed positive and statistically significant abnormal returns, thus 
contributing to the literature by favoring the occurrence of anomalies in Brazil. 
 
Based on the previously mentioned studies, one can already vouch for the importance 
of the specific methods used for the computation of the strategies analyzed and the 
periods of estimation, which may yield biased results due to the effect of inflation. As 
mentioned by Varga and Brito (2016), qualitative and quantitative differences in the 
pioneering literature applied to Brazil could be due to the inclusion or exclusion of a 
couple of years, altering the influential weight of each observation, which is a major 
problem in a period of inflation stabilization that severely impacted normal returns. 
 
A possible contribution to mitigate the momentum deadlock in Brazil comes from 
more recent literature, where authors research the behavior of momentum portfolios 
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during financial crashes. According to these studies, momentum crashes occur in bear 
markets (Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016) or periods of high volatility (Barroso & Santa-
Clara, 2014).  At this point, strategies experience losses of high magnitude, 
suggesting that momentum has a distribution with high crash risk. Therefore, the lack 
of evidence of the momentum phenomenon in the Brazilian market could be due to 
the losses incurred during periods of high turbulence, which would erase strategy 
profits in less turbulent times.  
 
Data 
This paper investigates the presence and performance of momentum-based strategies 
in the Brazilian market, as implemented by Jegadeesch and Titman (1993) in the 
North American market from 1965-1989 using data from the CRSP returns file. Data 
used in this research project was collected from 1986-2017, but only used from 
February 1995 until December 2017 in order to avoid the country’s hyperinflation 
plague that lasted from 1980-1994. Only stocks from the Bovespa Stock Exchange 
(São Paulo) with at least a $R2000M Market Capitalization as of January 2018 were 
considered in the paper (Mid-Cap stocks or above), yielding a total of 137 stocks 
within our sample. When collected, all arithmetic monthly returns were adjusted for 
earnings (dividends). Note that the sample of stocks was drawn purposely to account 
for the changing composition of the Bovespa index. 
 
Furthermore, data of the monthly number of trades of each stock was also collected in 
order for the construction of a liquidity filter. The market index, inflation index and 
the risk-free rate are parameterized by the Bovespa index (IBOV), IGP-DI (“Índice 
Geral de Preços – Disponibilidade Interna”) and the “CDI” rate (“Certificado de 




In this section, the creation of the different strategies is explained. All calculations 
leading to the portfolio’s returns were done using the Matlab software. Further 
analysis and tests on the results were conducted using Microsoft Excel and STATA.  
 
Before importing the data to Matlab, monthly stock returns were filtered according to 
the number of trades executed each month. In order to overcome the problem of stock 
illiquidity within the sample, monthly returns are only taken into account if the 
number of monthly trades is superior to 20. 
 
The “buy-the-winner and sell-the-loser” strategies consist of buying stocks that have 
performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly. As in the 
research of Jegadeesch and Titman (1993), this paper selects stocks based on their 
returns over the past 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. Likewise, holding periods vary between 3, 
6, 9 and 12 months. Having said this, the formation period is referred to as "	$%&'ℎ) 
while the holding period as *	$%&'ℎ). Hence, a (J, K) strategy is one that selects 
stocks based on their returns over the past "	$%&'ℎ) and holds them for *	$%&'ℎ). 
This report assumes the strategy holding period starts immediately after the portfolio 
formation period. The ranking processes to select which stocks comprise the “winner” 
and “loser” portfolios use the data filtered for liquidity, whereas the holding period 
returns are extracted from the non-filtered initial data set from Economática. 
 
In order to obtain robust results, both the arithmetic and geometric methods are used 
to compute returns in this paper. At the beginning of each month +, securities are 
ranked on the basis of their average geometric return in the past "	$%&'ℎ): 
,-,/




0> − 1	@%A	" = 3, 6, 9, 12     (1) 
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In the previous equation, ,-,/
0  is the return of stock F within the ranking period and 
,-,/789: is the monthly return of stock F  in the month + − ' + 1, where T is the 
month of forming the portfolio and J is the formation or ranking period. Based on 
these rankings, 10 decile equal weighted portfolios are formed, by applying the 
arithmetic mean to their components, and the strategies buy the top performing decile 
portfolio (“winners”) and sell the worst performing decile portfolio (“losers”) each 
month, holding it for *	$%&'ℎ). Returns for the winner and loser portfolio are then 
calculated separately as the arithmetic average of the returns of the various different 




∑,-,/ 	@%A	* = 3, 6, 9, 12     (2) 
In the previous equation, ,G,/H  is the return of the “winner” portfolio; L/  is the 
number of stocks in the “winner” portfolio and ,-,/  is the return of stock F, all 
variables at month +. The application of the previous formula is demonstrated for the 
winner portfolio, but it is also applied for the loser portfolio, (,M,/H ). On a monthly 
basis, the above procedures are continuously repeated in order for the winner and 
loser portfolios to be updated. 
 
According to Jegadeesch and Titman (1993), the use of overlapping portfolios 
provides more robust results due to the minimization of seasonal effects and other 
such event-driven effects. Thus, all strategies examined include portfolios with 
overlapping holding periods, meaning that in any given month +, the strategies: 
 
1) Hold a series of equal weight portfolios that are selected in the current month 
as well as in the previous * − "	$%&'ℎ) 
2) Close the position that was initiated in the month + − *  
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For instance, a (3, 3) “winner” portfolio consists of 3 investment units: positions from 
the top performing decile carried over from month + − 3, + − 2 and + − 1. At the 
end of month + the first of these investment units (+ − 3) is closed and replaced by a 
new investment in the decile with the highest 3-month geometric average return as of 
month '. Therefore, in order to calculate the return of the trading strategies, we first 










∑,M,8H 	     (3) 
Note that in the previous equation, O/ refers to the current number of investment units 
at month +. Consequently, the average return of the trading strategies is a long-short 






     (4) 
Following the Matlab computations, the resulting arithmetic returns are transformed 
into logarithmic returns to ensure robustness of results. In order to test for statistical 
significance of the strategies, a CAPM regression is generated the following way: 
(,(0,H),8 − 	AP,8) = 	Q + !	 ×	(,S,8 −	AP,8)     (5) 
In the previous equation, (,(0,H),8 − 	AP,8) represents the strategy’s excess return and 
(,S,8 −	AP,8) denotes the market risk premium. Positive and statistically significant 
alphas would suggest that the reported results indicate the existence of a momentum 
effect within the period of analysis of the chosen sample for this paper. 
 
As a result, this paper examines a total of 16 strategies to exploit the relative 
performance of Brazilian stock portfolios following a relative strength momentum 
strategy over different formation and holding periods. 
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Empirical Results and Analysis 
In this section, the results are presented for the whole period of estimation. An 
analysis of the descriptive statistics of the winner & loser portfolios individually as 
well as of the “Winners Minus Losers” (WML) strategies allows the identification of 
the most attractive relative strength momentum strategy, which is then examined in 
more detail. Transaction costs are then added to the analysis of the best strategy and a 
sub-period analysis is conducted to have a deeper understanding of the momentum 
anomaly in and out of crisis periods. Following the work of Daniel and Moskowitz 
(2016) and Piccoli et al. (2015), a brief analysis of systematic risk is also conducted 
for individual portfolios composing the final momentum strategies implemented. 
 
Winners, Losers and “Winners Minus Losers” 
Table 1 presents the annual returns and excess returns of winner and loser portfolios 
individually and of the WML strategies generated. Note that previously to the 
computation of the individual portfolio average returns, all individual series are 
adjusted for inflation. In the case of the WML strategies, the series are automatically 
adjusted for inflation because of the nature of the long-short portfolios. For the Sharpe 
ratio calculations, an annualized average risk-free rate for the whole period was used. 
Table 2 shows the average statistics for winners, losers and WML. Here, the most 
attractive strategy is also presented and compared against the benchmark. 
 
From these tables one can notice a clear difference between individual portfolios 
since winners generate high yearly returns and losers yield poorer returns, even 
though a considerable level of risk backs both. Although these portfolios show 
positive returns more often than not (in 61.17% of months for “winners” and 54.73% 
for “losers”), the measure of risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio or SR) is quite 
unappealing to investors, especially for the loser portfolios who show an average SR 
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of -0.14. The higher moments of the distributions for the individual portfolios suggest 
that on average, individual portfolios are approximately symmetric and leptokurtic 
when compared to the normal distribution. This means that, as demonstrated by their 
average excess kurtosis (2.89 for “winners” and 1.25 for “losers”), these individual 
return series have larger and sharper central peaks and fatter and longer tails than the 
normal distribution. Although slightly negatively skewed, distributions exhibit tails of 
almost the same length. 
 
A big reason for the unappealing Sharpe ratios is directly related to the magnitude of 
the annualized average risk-free rate assumed (15.50%). The Inter Deposit Rate 
(“CDI”) was created around the 1980s to insure better distribution of the financial 
institutions’ resources and is defined as a loan rate for transactions between banks or 
private institutions backed by private bonds. Brazil’s interest rate burden comes from 
decisions to stabilize a damaged system, which severely limits growth. These 
astonishingly high rates reflect the short-term credit risk in Brazil as well as the 
country’s monetary policy. In an economic environment with uncertainty regarding 
future prospects, reflected by equities, and extremely high yields that work as default 
insurance, the likelihood of negative Sharpe ratios increases. 
  
By subtracting the loser portfolios to those of the winners, we obtain the momentum 
strategies to be analyzed. These strategies show a lower average annual return than 
those of the individual loser portfolios (10.16% < 10.59%). This substantial decrease 
in return, coming from the combination of going long on the winners and shorting the 
losers, together with the high risk-free rate and an average annual volatility of 30.89% 
creates an average negative SR of -0.17, which is also lower than that of the loser 
portfolios. Out of all the strategies analyzed, the (6, 6) momentum strategy is deemed 
as the most attractive to investors because of its risk-return profile. This strategy 
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shows a much higher than average return (15.55% > 10.16%), bearing slightly more 
total risk but still managing to exhibit a fair risk adjusted profile (SR of 0.01). It also 
shows a higher skewness (0.26 > 0.07) and excess kurtosis (2.91 > 2.10) than the 
average WML strategy, meaning that although it has a higher likelihood of extreme 
events, it also shows a slightly longer right-hand side tail. Furthermore, the maximum 
drawdown of this strategy is better than that of the average WML strategy (-78.82% > 
83.73%). From these results and by comparing them with the average statistics of 
winners, one may find more appealing to construct a long only portfolio, forgetting 
about the short leg of the strategy, which clearly reduces profitability since it 
ultimately still ends up beating the Bovespa market index on average. Further 
discussion concerning the strategy is presented in the following sub-heading. 
 
It is also of primordial importance to mention that the strategies implemented are 
considered as well-diversified investments. This study analyzes strategies where 
individual portfolios hold a mean of 6 stocks, thus causing each long-short portfolio 
to hold on average 12 stocks. With the use of overlapping holding periods, each 
monthly investment unit will be composed of multiple long-short portfolios, causing 
the (6, 6) strategy to hold up to 72 stocks per month, which respects the standard of 
18/19 stocks, set by Brito (1989). Additionally, as observable in figure 1 the 
application of transaction costs on this strategy severely impacts profitability. Note 
that due to an extremely high turnover of stock holdings, a fixed monthly fee of 0.5% 
that is then deducted from monthly performance is assumed. 
 
Momentum and Financial Crises 
The long-short portfolios composing the momentum strategies being analyzed suffer 
occasional crashes, regardless of their magnitude. For this reason, and in order to 
explore the impact of financial crises in Brazil, the behavior of the momentum 
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strategies is also controlled for these periods of economic instability. As observable in 
figure 1, periods of crisis were assumed as classified by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) from the United States. These periods of recession are: 
March 2002 until November 2002 and December 2007 until June 2009 (all mentioned 
months are included). Furthermore, as in Piccoli et al. (2015) the monetary crisis in 
Brazil is also included from January 1999 until March 1999. Additionally, because of 
the longer time-series assumed in this research, the most recent and also the greatest 
Brazilian financial crisis in history is taken into account, ranging from January 2014 
until December 2016. This yields a total of 67 periods of crisis to be analyzed. 
 
From figure 1, two main points can be highlighted. First of all, one should notice the 
dichotomous behavior between the market index and the momentum strategy. Peaks 
of the strategy accompany the most pronounced market index lows and vice versa. 
This is essentially reflected by a negative beta coefficient as already exemplified in 
previous studies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993 & 2001; Rouwenhorst, 1998). 
Secondly, the graph also shows that the highest crashes of the momentum strategy 
occur during crisis periods, which is in line with findings from Piccoli et al. (2015). 
The main difference is, however, that, even though the Brazilian monetary crisis of 
2002 and the Global financial crisis of 2007-2009 show big declines in profits, the 
most recent crisis in Brazil has the steepest crash of them all. Further details on a 
possible explanation for these momentum crashes will also be approached later on. 
 
Table 3 presents the coefficients generated from CAPM regressions of all strategies 
for the whole period of estimation, while table 4 shows average annual statistics of all 
strategies examined and of the (6, 6) strategy individually for the estimation period as 
a whole, for periods of normal economic conditions and then for periods of crisis. The 
slightly negative alpha coefficients generated suggest that strategies yield a return that 
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can be, in great proportion, explained by the market risk factor. Although all alpha 
coefficients obtained are negative, the (6, 6) strategy shows the value of alpha that is 
the closest to zero (-0.03%), although not significant. Only the alpha of the (3, 3) 
strategy is significant at a 95% C.I. (-1.04%). However, the R-square statistic is quite 
low for all regressions conducted, suggesting poor goodness of fit of this model, 
which limits the study.  
 
As already explained in figure 1, the average beta coefficient of the strategies is 
negative (-0.3311) and that of the (6, 6) strategy is even lower than average (-0.3858). 
From table 4 we confirm that financial crises have a central role in the analysis of 
momentum strategies since these periods severely impact profits and compensation 
proportionately to the exposure to risk. It is interesting to note that although volatility 
diminishes slightly in crises periods, returns decrease enormously. As one would 
expect, the SR of these trading strategies is much better in normal periods than in 
periods of crisis. For instance, the (6, 6) strategy shows a SR of 0.10 in normal 
periods, much greater than that in crises (-0.31). These results suggest that although 
the volatility of the market remains high in and out of crises, the decline in returns 
severely downgrades the attractiveness of strategies. Contrary to normal period 
statistics, crises periods are also characterized by a more negatively skewed 
distribution and higher excess kurtosis, significantly increasing the number of 
negative months in the sample period considered. When measured against the 
Bovespa, average performance of momentum strategies in almost all sub-periods still 
seems to beat the market index in terms of risk-return profile, except for crises periods 
where the SR is lower (-0.42 for strategies and -0.33 for Bovespa). The (6, 6) strategy 
is more appealing than the market in every sub-period analysis conducted. 
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Furthermore, table 5 presents the CAPM alpha and beta coefficients for the returns 
series separated for these periods and the respective p-values to test significance of 
results. All alpha coefficients in crises periods are negative (ranging from -1.25% to -
2.13%) and those obtained for strategies in normal periods are all also negative apart 
from the one for the (6, 6) strategy (0.1%). However, this coefficient is not 
statistically significant. A general increase in beta coefficients for all strategies from 
normal periods to crises periods can also be observed.  
 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) claim that crashes of momentum portfolios are due to 
the systematic risk of losers. The suggestion is that the beta coefficients of these loser 
portfolios suffer an increase during crises periods, which in turn, when the market 
index recovers towards the end of the crisis, causes loser stocks to also recover in a 
more amplified way than winners. Consequently, since the momentum strategies 
being analyzed consist on shorting the loser leg, this yields negative returns of the 
momentum portfolios, which end up being designated as momentum crashes. Table 6 
supports this conclusion by demonstrating the alpha and beta coefficients of 
individual winner and loser portfolios in and out of periods of crisis as well as for the 
full period. In all sub-periods the WML strategies exhibit a negative beta, showing 
that its behavior is contrary to that of the market index, as previously discussed in 
figure 1. Results of table 6 now demonstrate that independently of the sub-period 
considered, the beta coefficient of the loser portfolio is always greater than that of the 
winner. Another critical point to observe is that the winner leg has a similar beta 
coefficient in both sub-periods considered (average beta in normal periods of 0.5888 
and of 0.5812 in crises periods). On the other hand, the loser leg has a beta, on 
average, of 0.8646 in normal periods that significantly increases to 1.0541 in crises. 
Also note that all individual winners in exhibit positive and significant alphas in the 
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full period of estimation, reinforcing the hypothesis that the application of a long-only 
portfolio can be of interest in the dynamics of the Brazilian stock exchange. 
Additionally, individual loser legs show positive alphas in the full, normal and crises 
periods, suggesting that assuming a short position is questionable. For losers, only 
normal and full period alphas with 3-month formation period show significant results. 
 
Conclusion 
This article investigates the profitability and performance of momentum strategies 
from February 1995 until December 2017. The (6, 6) momentum trading strategy has 
the highest average annual return (15.5%) and most attractive Sharpe ratio, also 
managing to be the only strategy with a positive average annual excess return 
(0.42%). Profits for this strategy remain after the application of fixed monthly 
transaction costs. 
 
As demonstrated by previous studies, the research fails to prove statistically 
significant abnormal returns for the WML strategies in the full estimation period, 
although these strategies beat the Bovespa index. Results also suggest that the main 
driver of momentum profitability of the WML portfolios is the winner leg. A sub-
period analysis confirms this and also allows for the identification of what is behind 
momentum crashes. Given descriptive statistics and positive significant alpha 
coefficients for “winners”, momentum effect does exist for the winner leg in the full 
period, which is then erased by its inclusion in a long-short strategy. The impact of 
the “losers” is observed by a considerable increase in their beta coefficient in periods 
of crisis, which indicates that the rebound is characterized by an increased magnitude 
of the recovery of these loser portfolios in comparison with the overall market index 
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Table 1: Annualized relative strength portfolio logarithmic returns of winners, losers and 
WML. Calculations for the figures in this table vary according to the number of observations 
given the formation period selected (J): A formation period of 3, 6, 9 and 12 months 
corresponds to 272, 269, 266 and 263 observations. Additionally, Sharpe ratios are presented 
in parentheses for each time-series of returns. 
 
 
Table 2: Average annual descriptive statistics of Winner and Loser portfolios individually 
and of WML portfolios. Key figures for the (6, 6) strategy, which was deemed as most 
attractive and the Bovespa Index are also presented. As for table 1, the Sharpe ratio was 
calculated using the average annualized risk-free rate (CDI). 
 
 
J K	= 3 6 9 12 K	= 3 6 9 12
3	Sell 11,26% 5,92% 6,50% 5,70% 19,08% 13,75% 14,33% 13,53%
(0,10) (-0,05) (-0,04) (-0,06) - - - -
3	Buy 14,97% 14,65% 13,39% 13,43% 22,80% 22,48% 21,22% 21,26%
(0,26) (0,26) (0,22) (0,22) - - - -
3	Buy-Sell -11,78% -6,77% -8,61% -7,76% 3,72% 8,73% 6,89% 7,73%
(-0,41) (-0,26) (-0,36) (-0,33)
6	Sell 2,21% 1,35% 2,81% 1,99% 9,82% 8,96% 10,42% 9,60%
(-0,15) (-0,19) (-0,15) (-0,18) - - - -
6	Buy 17,05% 16,90% 15,53% 14,12% 24,66% 24,51% 23,14% 21,73%
(0,32) (0,31) (0,27) (0,23) - - - -
6	Buy-Sell -0,28% 0,42% -2,40% -3,00% 14,85% 15,55% 12,73% 12,13%
(-0,02) (0,01) (-0,09) (-0,12)
9	Sell 3,90% 0,50% 1,74% 2,95% 11,17% 7,76% 9,01% 10,21%
(-0,12) (-0,21) (-0,19) (-0,16) - - - -
9	Buy 15,34% 12,09% 10,97% 10,56% 22,61% 19,36% 18,23% 17,82%
(0,24) (0,13) (0,09) (0,08) - - - -
9	Buy-Sell -3,41% -3,25% -5,63% -7,24% 11,44% 11,60% 9,22% 7,61%
(-0,12) (-0,11) (-0,20) (-0,26)
12	Sell -0,22% -1,42% 1,98% 2,97% 6,92% 5,72% 9,11% 10,10%
(-0,23) (-0,27) (-0,19) (-0,16) - - - -
12	Buy 12,5% 8,3% 11,6% 11,2% 19,63% 15,48% 18,76% 18,35%
(0,14) (0,00) (0,11) (0,10) - - - -
12	Buy-Sell -1,95% -4,89% -5,01% -6,41% 12,71% 9,76% 9,65% 8,25%
(-0,08) (-0,17) (-0,18) (-0,23)
Panel	A	-	Average	annual	excess	returns Panel	B	-	Average	annual	returns
Winners Losers WML (6,	6)	Strategy IBovespa
Observations - - - 269 269
μ	(%) 20,75% 10,59% 10,16% 15,55% 5,70%
σ	(%) 28,54% 34,24% 30,89% 32,33% 29,56%
Skewness -0,03 -0,02 0,07 0,26 -1,18
Kurtosis 2,89 1,25 2,10 2,91 4,78
Sharpe	ratio 0,18 -0,14 -0,17 0,01 -0,33
Maximum	Drawdown	(%) - - -83,73% -78,82% -78,18%
%	Positive	months 61,17% 54,73% 55,35% 49,81% 55,02%
%	Negative	months 37,18% 43,45% 42,99% 50,19% 44,98%
 23 
Figure 1:Compounded cumulative returns of strategy (6, 6) before and after fees 
compared against the compounded cumulative Bovespa market returns adjusted for 
inflation. Note that fees displayed in this figure are of 0.5% deducted per monthly 
performance. Shaded areas represent periods of crisis in Brazil. 
 
 
Table 3: Alpha and beta coefficients from CAPM model generated by strategies’ 
excess returns regressed against the Bovespa market premium. P-values of each 
coefficient are provided in parentheses in order to measure statistical significance.1 
 
  
                                                   
1 Statistical significance for the alpha coefficient is shown by the number of * next to the respective p-
value of the coefficient. If coefficient is significant at a 99% C.I. (p-value < 0.01) * will show, at a 95% 
C.I. (p-value < 0.05) ** will show and at a 90% C.I. (p-value < 0.1) *** will show. This method of 
evaluating significance is applied in each table 
J K	= 3 6 9 12 K	= 3 6 9 12
3	Buy-Sell -0,0104 -0,0062 -0,0077 -0,0070 -0,3433 -0,3246 -0,2998 -0,2788
(0,029)** (0,145) (0,054)*** (0,071)*** (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
6	Buy-Sell -0,0008 -0,0003 -0,0025 -0,0030 -0,4115 -0,3858 -0,3493 -0,3243
(0,876) (0,961) (0,618) (0,532) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
9	Buy-Sell -0,0034 -0,0032 -0,0051 -0,0064 -0,3949 -0,3573 -0,3067 -0,3053
(0,564) (0,576) (0,347) (0,215) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
12	Buy-Sell -0,0023 -0,0047 -0,0047 -0,0060 -0,3372 -0,2927 -0,2836 -0,3019
(0,707) (0,434) (0,399) (0,268) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Panel	A	-	CAPM	Alphas Panel	B	-	CAPM	Betas
 24 
Table 4: Average annual descriptive statistics of all strategies and of (6, 6) strategy 
solely presented on total (or general) period of estimation, in normal periods and in 




Table 5: Alpha and Beta coefficients from CAPM model generated by strategies’ 
excess returns in and out of crisis periods regressed against the Bovespa market 
premium. P-values of each coefficient are provided in parentheses in order to 




General Normal	periods Crisis	periods General Normal	periods Crisis	periods
Observations - - - 269 202 67
μ	(%) 10,16% 12,22% 3,71% 15,55% 18,79% 6,37%
σ	(%) 30,89% 31,77% 28,31% 32,33% 33,22% 29,75%
Sharpe	ratio -0,17 -0,10 -0,42 0,01 0,10 -0,31
Skewness 0,07 0,21 -0,64 0,26 0,54 -0,48
Kurtosis 2,10 1,91 2,64 2,91 3,14 2,31
%	Positive	months 55,35% 57,80% 51,61% 49,81% 58,91% 53,73%
%	Negative	months 42,99% 42,20% 48,39% 50,19% 41,09% 44,78%
Panel	A	-	Average	Strategy	Returns Panel	B	-	(6,	6)	Strategy	Statistics
J K	= 3 6 9 12 K	= 3 6 9 12
3	Buy-Sell -0,0104 -0,0060 -0,0063 -0,0058 -0,2949 -0,2787 -0,2546 -0,2364
(0,076)*** (0,252) (0,198) (0,226) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
6	Buy-Sell -0,0010 0,0010 -0,0017 -0,0028 -0,3695 -0,3475 -0,3085 -0,2753
(0,881) (0,882) (0,787) (0,638) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
9	Buy-Sell -0,0017 -0,0019 -0,0046 -0,0069 -0,3497 -0,2962 -0,2466 -0,2565
(0,813) (0,791) (0,489) (0,284) (0,000) (0,001) (0,003) (0,001)
12	Buy-Sell -0,0025 -0,0053 -0,0043 -0,0062 -0,2642 -0,2128 -0,2101 -0,2468
(0,732) (0,461) (0,525) (0,345) (0,003) (0,015) (0,011) (0,002)
3	Buy-Sell -0,0207 -0,0167 -0,0213 -0,0191 -0,4555 -0,4316 -0,4122 -0,3860
(0,010)* (0,023)** (0,002)** (0,001)* (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
6	Buy-Sell -0,0125 -0,0152 -0,0155 -0,0137 -0,5388 -0,5007 -0,4718 -0,4707
(0,201) (0,102) (0,057)*** (0,055)*** (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
9	Buy-Sell -0,0207 -0,0185 -0,0165 -0,0147 -0,5483 -0,5273 -0,4729 -0,4406
(0,064)*** (0,062)*** (0,060)*** (0,075)*** (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
12	Buy-Sell -0,0126 -0,0127 -0,0155 -0,0148 -0,5427 -0,5015 -0,4859 -0,4607





Table 6: Alpha and Beta coefficients and respective P-values generated from CAPM model of individual Winner and Loser portfolios regressed 
against the Bovespa market premium in the full period (general), normal periods and periods of crisis. Note that individual excess returns of 




Portfolios (3,	3) (3,	6) (3,	9) (3,	12) (6,	3) (6,	6) (6,	9) (6,	12) (9,	3) (9,	6) (9,	9) (9,	12) (12,	3) (12,	6) (12,	9) (12,	12)
α 0,0111 0,0109 0,0099 0,0098 0,1250 0,0123 0,0112 0,0099 0,0109 0,0083 0,0074 0,0070 0,0093 0,0058 0,0084 0,0078
β 0,6045 0,6057 0,6084 0,6033 0,5794 0,5710 0,5785 0,5643 0,5698 0,5862 0,5931 0,5788 0,6175 0,6197 0,6042 0,5702
α 0,0108 0,0062 0,0065 0,0057 0,0033 0,0023 0,0033 0,0024 0,0045 0,0014 0,0021 0,0030 0,0015 0,0001 0,0027 0,0034
β 0,9391 0,9217 0,9002 0,8752 0,9887 0,9521 0,9244 0,8872 0,9659 0,9391 0,8968 0,8815 0,9564 0,9111 0,8879 0,8725
α 0,0161 0,0148 0,0145 0,0140 0,0151 0,0158 0,0144 0,0127 0,0139 0,0114 0,0100 0,0094 0,0108 0,0078 0,0112 0,0105
β 0,5809 0,5907 0,5873 0,5897 0,573 0,5733 0,5829 0,5722 0,5650 0,596 0,6005 0,5774 0,6254 0,6368 0,6107 0,5596
α 0,0130 0,0073 0,0073 0,0063 0,0030 0,0018 0,003 0,0023 0,0027 0,0004 0,0019 0,0035 0,0007 0,0004 0,0030 0,0041
β 0,8755 0,8691 0,8415 0,8258 0,9393 0,9176 0,8883 0,8444 0,9115 0,889 0,8439 0,8307 0,8875 0,8475 0,8187 0,8032
α -0,0037 -0,0012 -0,0041 -0,0027 0,0047 0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,002 -0,0014 -0,0008 -0,0004 0,0044 -0,0006 -0,0002 -0,0001
β 0,6412 0,625 0,6402 0,6183 0,5827 0,5471 0,5513 0,5304 0,5670 0,5464 0,5617 0,5701 0,5911 0,5687 0,5751 0,5832
α 0,0059 0,0044 0,006 0,0052 0,0061 0,0053 0,0055 0,0038 0,0116 0,006 0,0046 0,0031 0,0059 0,001 0,0041 0,0035
β 1,0917 1,0515 1,0473 0,9992 1,1165 1,0428 1,018 0,996 1,1102 1,0686 1,0296 1,0056 1,1287 1,0652 1,0559 1,0388
α 0,004* 0,002* 0,004* 0,004* 0,003* 0,003* 0,005* 0,011** 0,013** 0,059*** 0,084*** 0,096*** 0,033** 0,180 0,050** 0,062***
β 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
α 0,003* 0,056*** 0,035** 0,053*** 0,408 0,536 0,367 0,488 0,303 0,735 0,583 0,409 0,737 0,980 0,487 0,356
β 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
α 0,001* 0,001* 0,001* 0,001* 0,004* 0,002* 0,004* 0,010* 0,012** 0,040** 0,061*** 0,070*** 0,050** 0,151 0,034** 0,004*
β 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
α 0,001* 0,039** 0,029** 0,051*** 0,508 0,669 0,466 0,54 0,57 0,924 0,665 0,395 0,886 0,926 0,5 0,333
β 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
α 0,486 0,82 0,417 0,578 0,377 0,829 0,837 0,83 0,731 0,815 0,905 0,947 0,445 0,929 0,971 0,984
β 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
α 0,427 0,562 0,407 0,43 0,5 0,558 0,505 0,607 0,246 0,535 0,592 0,69 0,562 0,92 0,633 0,649
β 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Cr
ise
s "Winners"
"Losers"
Ge
ne
ra
l
No
rm
al
Cr
ise
s "Winners"
P-values	of	respective	coefficients
Ge
ne
ra
l "Winners"
"Losers"
No
rm
al "Winners"
"Losers"
Momentum	Strategies
"Winners"
"Losers"
"Winners"
"Losers"
"Losers"
